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Migration controls in Italy and Hungary: 
 From Conditionalized to Domesticized Humanitarianism at the EU 
borders 
Abstract 
This article analyses the migration control narrative in Italy and Hungary at the nexus 
of humanitarianism and securitisation. We concentrate on how the humanitarian 
discourse is undervalued as the EU border states emphasise either full securitisation or 
else securitisation as a condition for humanitarianism when it comes to border 
management and refugee protection measures. We trace, first, how politicians 
conceptualise humanitarianism for the self and for the extension of the self; and, 
second, how they conditionalize humanitarianism for the other. Reflecting on the 
institutional and discursive nexus of humanitarianism and securitization in effect to 
migration controls, our aim is also to contextualise political narratives of Europe and 
how politicians use them to affect the public. We elaborate on this nexus considering 
how it foregrounds human rights for the self but challenges humanitarianism as it 
undervalues human rights for the other. In order to see how migration politics is framed 
for everyday consumption, we are referring to tropes emerging in major political 
speeches in Italy and Hungary, and develop two conceptual terms suggesting 
conditionalised humanitarianism and domesticised humanitarianism. 
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This article analyses the migration control narrative in Italy and Hungary at the 
nexus of humanitarianism and securitisation. Noteworthy for our purposes is how the 
humanitarian discourse is undervalued as the EU border states emphasise either full 
securitisation or else securitisation as a condition for humanitarianism when it comes 
to border management and refugee protection measures. In effect, our goal is to trace, 
on the one hand, how politicians conceptualise humanitarianism for the self and for the 
extension of the self; and, on the other, how they conditionalize humanitarianism for 
the other. The term humanitarianism refers to those activities “intended to relieve 
suffering, stop preventable harm, save lives at risk, and improve the welfare of 
vulnerable populations” (Barnett 2013, 383). The humanitarian-securitisation nexus 
indicates a simultaneous mobilisation of humanitarian and securitisation discourses in 
which the humanitarian rhetoric can also be used to justify and legitimise the 
implementation of security measures (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Cuttitta 2018; Sciurba 
and Furri 2018). Reflecting on the institutional and discursive nexus of 
humanitarianism and securitization in effect to migration controls, our aim is also to 
contextualise political narratives of Europe and how politicians use them to affect the 
public. We elaborate on this nexus considering how it foregrounds human rights for the 
self but challenges humanitarianism as it undervalues human rights for the other.  
To trace political communication over migration governance at the 
humanitarianism/securitization nexus, we offer a study on “old” and “new” EU member 
states which stand at sea and land borders. In Hungary for much longer, but in Italy 
much recently, conservative right politics have become dominant. In order to see how 
migration politics is framed for everyday consumption, we are referring to tropes 
emerging in major political speeches in Italy and Hungary. The Italian context takes the 
 
 
migrant as the subject of humanitarian discourse. However, in developing a strategy of 
border management, security objectives prevail as a condition of humanitarianism. We 
call this conditionalised humanitarianism. Looking at the context of Hungary, the self 
as the subject of humanitarianism is the Hungarian/European and the extension of the 
self is the Middle Eastern Christian. We refer to this as domesticised humanitarianism. 
The next section spells out the conceptual and methodological assumptions that 
underscore our assumptions.  
 
Conceptualisation 
The primary aim of anti-immigrant political narratives is to construct certain 
“in- and out-group” identities by applying “strategies of positive self-presentation and 
negative presentation of others” (Wodak 2009, 40). Thus, we approach narratives with 
an Althusserian focus, i.e., we explicate narratives as discourse that interpellates 
subjects by the transmission of messages, which the public can subsequently identify 
with. Henceforth, narratives construct knowledge in a way in which only certain 
interpretations and modes of reasoning are possible: they create a connotative chain by 
which members of the public come to identify with the content and the subject-positions 
that they transmit and aim to pursue (Weldes 1996). The discursive presentation of 
policy objectives as such both reflects and reproduces certain shared beliefs and 
concepts salient to the public, and a shared identity that underpins these objectives 
(Hansen 2006, 18-23).  
While elites construct discourse, discourses also speak through us, through our 
human agency, and thereby privilege and shape certain ways of apprehending the 
world. A discursive frame then becomes a deeply structured symbolic apparatus that 
we use to make sense of the world (Korkut and Eslen-Ziya 2018). According to Mumby 
 
 
and Clair (1997, 202), “this frame provides the fundamental categories in which 
thinking can take place. It establishes the limits of discussion and defines the range of 
problems that can be addressed”. There has been ample research in this regard in 
security studies (Balzacq 2005; Van Rythoven 2015) and what we earlier proposed as 
“discursive governance” in policy research (Korkut et al. 2015). In this sense, narratives 
relate to “patterns and commonalities of knowledge” (Wodak 2008, 6), and gain an 
“increasingly conceptual nature” (Krzyżanowski 2016). Narratives always unfold in a 
certain historical, social and political context, which inescapably determines their 
forthcoming comprehension and interpretation (van Dijk 2008). Thus, embedding 
narratives in appropriate contexts, or “recontextualising” the conceptual frame in which 
they operate, is crucial so that narratives can take effect (Krzyżanowski 2016 and 2019).  
Following this interpretation, we will follow the transformation of the 
humanitarianism narrative facing securitization. We will demonstrate first how 
recontextualisation of humanitarianism for the self – but not the other – legitimises 
strategies of migration control and exclusion and second how reconceptualisation of 
human rights as the rights of citizens and of Christianity as a constituent of 
national/European identity abate humanitarianism and constrain its universal essence. 
Moreover, in showing how humanitarian rhetoric, albeit with an interpretation limited 
to protect the self against the other, is used to justify and legitimize the implementation 
of security measures, we argue that humanitarianism and securitization do not 
necessarily represent two distinct logics. Instead, the analysis of narratives in this study 
highlights that securitization could be conceived as a condition for humanitarianism as 
they adopt a streamlined common logic (Little and Vaughan-Williams 2017; Stepka 
2018; Watson 2011). The next section illustrates our methodology for studying 





Western governments increasingly emphasise their responsibility to protect the 
human rights of their citizens as opposed to the human rights of non-citizens whom 
they also qualify to pose danger. This is how humanitarianism becomes prone to 
politicisation to accommodate securitisation demands. We follow this process via two 
methods of communication practices in two contexts. The Italian context illustrates 
communication with references to an institutionalised essence of migration controls 
while the Hungarian context appeals to narratives as its primary term of 
communication. In Italy narratives of humanitarianism and securitization have shaped 
the following discourses that refer to first the need to strengthen solidarity among EU 
Member States in tackling migration flows – through the establishment of a fair 
distribution of responsibilities between them – and second the necessity to establish 
cooperation with North African countries through bilateral agreements. The Hungarian 
government’s narrative stated that migrants threaten the Hungarian and European 
citizens’ cultural and socio-economic rights, and international protection can only be 
guaranteed in situ and for those similar to the Christian self. However, they both imply 
preventing arrivals to Europe at the first place.  
We also explore communication styles and references that affect the 
formulation of the humanitarianism/securitisation nexus insomuch as how this nexus 
undervalues human rights. On the one hand, the content of the bilateral agreements 
signed between Italy and North African countries shows the prevalence of domestic 
securitarian interests over human rights considerations (Paoletti 2012). In fact, since 
cooperation is established with countries where systematic violations of human rights 
are reported, an externalization strategy affects refugees’ and asylum seekers’ 
 
 
fundamental rights adversely (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016). Border externalization 
“attempt[s] to (or effectively) limit formal legal obligations, including the right to seek 
and enjoy asylum by preventing migrants from ever coming under the jurisdiction of 
destination states” (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016, 197). On the other, in Hungarian 
narratives, we note a hierarchy of those who deserve rights and guaranteeing one’s 
place in this hierarchy insomuch as their identity is in confluence with the national 
characteristics that underpin host states. Thereafter, human right to protection against 
persecution can become symbolically attached to migrants’ similarity to the self and 
docility for the established European order even if the self and the institutionalised 
order seek to keep the migrants at bay and away.  
Over the next sections, we will depict conditionalised and domesticised 
humanitarianism looking at the Italian and Hungarian cases. Their discursive making 
rests on the circulation of certain tropes such as the ‘defence of European civilisation’, 
‘great wandering of people’ and ‘fair share of responsibilities’; border control, 
externalisation, and development aid practices as well as endorsing a moral duty 
narrative to protect the regular migrant or those that stay in situ. Given the curbs on 
regular migration as well as development policies geared to keep people away from 
European borders, however, this also shows how securitization condition 
humanitarianism. To this extent, we reflect on Krzyżanowski’s (2016 and 2019) 
discourse-conceptual analysis considering the intersection of constructions of the 
imagined and the real affecting who deserves humanitarianism and who should be 
securitised and kept well beyond the borders of the self. In this effort, politicians’ 
recontextualization of the “crisis” that the self experiences at the face of increasing 
external migration, thereby, the arrival of the other, allows a de facto description of 
irregular arrivals as invasive and threatening Krzyżanowski, (2019, 466). Similar to 
 
 
Krzyżanowski’s (2019) analysis of Brexit debates amidst “the predominance of the 
past/present-to-future dimension of discourse which served  as a tool in connecting the 
imaginary and the real”, external migration narratives qualified by humanitarianism and 
securitization related political tropes, practices, and discourses as well as the 
construction of the self and the other within the realm of these debates bring forth 
references from the past and the future-to-be to eventually transforming both the self 
and the other. Pertinently, such “expected and imaginary crises” (Krzyżanowski 2019, 
467) aim at burdening what is known with what can be unknown. Hence, our article 
explores the repercussions of macro political narratives facing the boundaries of the 
self and the other, and discuss what happens when meta-narratives of humanitarianism 
and securitization clash to either conditionalize or domesticize assistance to the other 
and legitimise various forms of regulation (Krzyżanowski 2016).  In the conclusion 
part, we will come back how political communication styles operate to boost the 
relevance of humanitarianism/securitisation nexus to publics and re-visit their 
conceptualisation of through political discourse.  
 
Italy: Conditionalised Humanitarianism 
Italy presents an institutionalised exclusionary regime sustained by an emphasis 
on externalisation by political actors despite changing governments. Two key features 
in the development of the Italian border management and migration control regime can 
be identified as follows: the adoption of the ‘hotspot approach’ and the security-driven 
externalisation of border controls. The hotspot approach has been launched shortly 
before the peak of the European migration crisis as part of the European Agenda on 
Migration in 2015. It aims at providing assistance to countries with high migratory 
pressure and coordinating the activities of EU and national authorities at the external 
 
 
borders of the EU. In practice, hotspots are facilities for initial reception, identification, 
registration and fingerprinting of migrants arriving in the EU by sea, and they have 
become crucial for the overall Italian asylum system in the areas of first reception and 
repatriation and for the relocation programme since 2015 (European Parliamentary 
Research Service 2018).  
We focus on the process of externalisation of border controls, which refers to 
those actions aimed at preventing migrants, including asylum seekers, from entering 
the territories of destination countries (Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016). Though the 
Italian externalisation strategy has been supported by narratives that are both 
humanitarian and security-oriented in nature, the security-oriented objective has 
prevailed also as a condition of humanitarianism. Through externalisation and 
admission procedures, decisions have become no longer confined to the actual physical 
border but involved the point of departure – or of transit – as well (Menjívar 2014). In 
a nutshell, the term externalisation refers to “a process that moves the migration control 
policies beyond the (European) external borders” (Biondi 2012, 149; see also Guild and 
Bigo 2005).  
As part of an externalisation strategy, the agreements signed by Italy with 
countries of origin and transit to prevent irregular immigration and to establish a 
procedure to enforce return have clearly served “as enabling instruments for the Italian 
push-back policy” (Andrade 2014, 52). As a legal expert has commented, the Italian 
approach to border management in the last few years can be defined as ‘schizophrenic’1. 
There have been times of restriction in access to the territory and times of opening 
concerning search and see rescue operations. The same definition might apply to the 
discourses geared for the public debate. As the analysis shows, there has been an 
 
1 Interview with a legal expert, 18 October 2018, Florence, Italy. 
 
 
alternation of narratives over humanitarianism and securitisation of border management 
and migration control with a constant emphasis on solidarity at the EU level and 
externalisation towards African countries. 
Narratives of humanitarianism have been focusing on the commitment by the 
Italian government to save migrants’ lives and protect their human rights. However, the 
humanitarian discourse is strictly intertwined with that of securitisation, which stresses 
the need to fight against illegal immigration, smuggling of migrants, and terrorism. 
Indeed, humanitarianism and securitisation have often gone hand in hand. Crucial to 
the analysis of the ‘security-oriented and humanitarian nexus’ is the discourse 
developed around the Mare Nostrum operation, officially an humanitarian mission 
launched by the Italian government in 2013 to address the dramatic increase of 
migration flows in the Strait of Sicily2. In fact, “although the stress was mainly put on 
the humanitarian aim of saving lives at sea, Mare Nostrum was also presented […] as 
a security mission aiming at capturing smugglers” (Cuttitta 2014, 27). As declared by 
the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Emma Bonino (Italian Radicals)3, 
(1) In the Sahelian crossing, the mixture of real refugees and 
other types of more worrying people becomes […] very 
evident. This is why Operation Mare Nostrum, which we 
hope will sooner or later also become a European operation, 
certainly has the merit of saving people [...] but also a 
possibility of filtering and controlling refugees who are 
‘less refugees’4.  
 
The security-oriented and humanitarian mix has also characterised the discourse 
over externalisation, which emphasised the need to establish cooperation with – and 
provide assistance to – North African countries. Decision-makers – from both the 
 
2 Mare Nostrum was a military operation launched on 14th October 2013 and enhanced by a resolution of the Council 
of Ministers approved on the same day. It started on the 18th October 2013 and ended on 31st October 2014. The 
operation was as a response to the Lampedusa shipwreck of 3 October 2013, when 368 migrants died after their boat 
sank before reaching Italian shores. 
3 Government led by Enrico Letta (grand coalition, 2013-2014) 
4 Parliamentary intervention, 12 December 2013. 
 
 
center-left and the center-right – have always considered the externalisation of border 
management and migration control as the winning strategy to curb migratory flows. In 
2007, an agreement for the joint patrolling of the Libyan coast was presented as 
necessary to stop smugglers, and therefore to save human lives and disrupt criminal 
organisations. One year before, with regard to deaths at sea, the Minister of the Interior 
Giuliano Amato (Independent)5 had declared:  
(2) I would like it to be rationally perceived that these 
phenomena are inhuman and that we have a civil and moral 
obligation to intervene to put an end to them. To put an end 
to these phenomena means, however, to stop the flow of 
illegal immigration, because it is a flow organized by […] 
criminal organizations that put migrants’ lives at risk, first 
in the desert and then in the crossing of the Mediterranean. 
I see patrolling activities to be carried out mainly near the 
Libyan coasts, to prevent [migrants] from entering the 
Mediterranean6.  
 
In 2009, the Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni (Northern League)7 
declared that “since the agreement with Libya came into force, [thousands of people] 
have not left Libya. This is the most positive fact, I believe, because the […] tragedy 
of so many deaths at sea has been avoided”8. When during the same year several push-
back operations were conducted by the Italian authorities, the Prime Minister Silvio 
Berlusconi declared, “we must keep doors open to those who enter according to quotas 
and close it against mass migration […]. Push-backs are important and necessary 
because they avoid tragedies at sea, they are an act of great humanity”9. These 
statements provide an example of a mix of security-oriented and humanitarian 
approaches in border management that focuses on the “humanitarian consequences of 
 
5 Government led by Romano Prodi (center-left, 2006-2008) 
6 Parliamentary intervention, 3 August 2006. 
7 Government led by Silvio Berlusconi (center-right, 2008-2011). 
8 Parliamentary intervention, 23 September 2009. 





smuggling and trafficking activities” (Cuttitta 2014, 25), notwithstanding the anti-
humanitarian consequences of the restrictive control policies implemented. 
In 2011, the then Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni (Northern League)10 
emphasised the necessity of intensifying the “diplomatic activity towards the countries 
of origin, primarily with Tunisia, [and] strengthening the relations with other countries, 
namely Egypt, Morocco and Algeria”11. With regard to Tunisia, the Minister argued 
that “cooperation in border surveillance at sea is absolutely important, together with 
that of repatriation, because it serves to prevent landings, which is always the best thing 
to do since it makes it possible to save human lives”12.  
Similarly, one year later, during a parliamentary committee hearing, the 
Minister of the Interior Anna Maria Cancellieri (Independent)13 stressed that the 
government aim was to help North African countries to ‘work’ better on their territory:  
(3) Government efforts to find effective means for combating 
illegal immigration continue. In this direction, […] bilateral 
cooperation policy has been given new impetus and 
collaboration with North African countries, in particular 
Tunisia and Libya, has therefore been resumed. The need is 
to ensure greater efficiency in border control, combining it 
with respect for human rights […]. [This strategy] of 
cooperation with the Libyan authorities in the field of 
migration is part of a context that favours […] a preventive 
approach to the phenomenon with a view to strengthening 
the capacity of the Libyan police forces in the fight against 
criminal organisations and better management […] of the 
migrant population”14.  
 
In 2013, the Parliamentary Committee Responsible for Monitoring the 
Implementation of the Schengen Agreement stated in a report that “with a view to 
solidarity in the management of external borders, it is necessary and urgent for the 
 
10 Government led by Silvio Berlusconi (center-right, 2008-2011). 
11 Parliamentary intervention, 7 April 2011. 
12 Parliamentary intervention, 7 April 2011. 
13 Government led by Mario Monti (technocratic government, 2011 – 2013). 
14 Hearing of the Minister of the Interior on Immigration Issues within the context of the Extraordinary Commission 
for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 16 May 2012. 
 
 
European Union to act as a counterpart to bilateral agreements with […] African 
countries, in order to govern migration flows and to facilitate return policy” (Chamber 
of Deputies and Senate of the Republic 2013, 20). As also stated in a 2016 
Communication of the European Commission, 
(4) Development and neighbourhood policy tools should 
reinforce local capacity-building, including border control, 
asylum, counter-smuggling and reintegration efforts. All 
actors – Member States, EU institutions and key third 
countries – need to work together in partnership to bring 
order into migratory flows. [In particular], positive and 
negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's 
development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil 
their international obligation to readmit their own nationals, 
and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular 
migrants from third countries […]. Equally, there must be 
consequences for those who do not cooperate on 
readmission and return15.  
 
During the same year, in a letter to the Presidents of the European Commission 
and the European Council – Jean-Claude Juncker and Donald Tusk respectively – the 
Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (Democratic Party)16 emphasised the importance 
of pursuing an externalization strategy:  
(5) The external dimension of migration policies is 
fundamental for the survival of Schengen and the principle 
of free movement. The management of migratory flows is 
no longer sustainable without a targeted and enhanced 
cooperation with third countries, both of origin and 
transit17. 
 
Furthermore, in 2017, in a letter to the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Minister of the Interior Marco Minniti 
 
15 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the 
European Investment Bank on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European 
Agenda on Migration (COM(2016) 385 final, Strasbourg, 7.6.2016, p. 2, 9). 
16 Center-left Government, 2014 – 2016. 
17 Letter to the Presidents of the European Commission and the European Council, 15 April 2016. 
 
 
(Democratic Party)18, remarked that in order to encourage a reduction in migratory 
flows,  
(6) The […] Italian strategy […] focuses [also] on supporting 
Libyan authorities responsible for border control and flow 
management. [This strategy] contributes to reducing the 
risk of accidents and shipwrecks, a risk that can only be 
eliminated by stopping departures19.  
 
In the same letter, the Minister specifies that the activity of the Italian authorities 
is limited to training, equipment and logistical support of the Libyan Coast Guard, with 
the aim of preventing “life-threatening crossings and ensuring compliance with 
international reception standards in Libya”20. Few months before, in a speech to the 
Democratic Party Congress, the Minister had stated that “it is a moral duty to welcome 
those who flee war, those who flee famine, unaccompanied minors: we will always 
welcome them!”, but also added that “part of this game is played outside national 
borders, a large part of this problem is in Africa, and we must clearly tell Europe that 
Africa is the mirror of Europe”21. In June 2018, in his inaugural speech to Parliament, 
the Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte (Independent)22, has stated that  
(7) [W]e defend and will defend immigrants who regularly 
arrive on our territory, work, fit into our communities, 
respecting the laws and, indeed, offering a contribution that 
we consider decisive to the development of the country. But 
to ensure the indispensable integration we must […] fight 
with severe determination the most odious forms of 
exploitation related to trafficking in human beings, 
perpetrated by unscrupulous smugglers23.  
 
 
18 Government led by Paolo Gentiloni (center-left, 2016 – 2018). 
19 Letter to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 October 2017 
20 Letter to the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, 11 October 2017. 
21 Speech to the Democratic Party Congress, 15 March 2017. 
22 Populist Government, 2018-2019. 
23 Inaugural speech to Parliament (Senate), 5 June 2018. 
 
 
Moreover, the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Matteo Salvini 
(Northern League)24 during a parliamentary speech insisted on the need to purse an 
externalisation strategy: “[w]e are working with Libya […] for the provision of means, 
[…] training, [and] economic support. [However], the problem is not limited to Libya; 
it is necessary to involve Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco”25. 
Beyond the concurrent narratives and discourses on humanitarianism and 
securitisation, the strategy of externalisation of border controls, security objectives 
certainly outweigh humanitarian aims (Cuttitta 2014). The Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) signed between Italy and Libya in 2011 emphasized the need to 
strengthen cooperation in combating smuggling of migrants and terrorism. The same 
holds for the MoU signed between Italy and Sudan in 2016 and that signed again with 
Libya in 2017. This is all in line with a general orientation towards a more stringent 
regulation of the migration phenomenon to reduce the incidence of irregular 
immigration. More recently, a crucial actor in fuelling the securitisation of the 
migration phenomenon has been Matteo Salvini, who stressed the need to defend 
borders and to block departures from African shores. 
In the debate, the narrative – again shared from both the center-left and the 
center-right – related to the need of solidarity and fair share of responsibilities (burden-
sharing) between EU Member States has also played a crucial role. As stated in 2011 
by the Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni26, 
(8) A system that leaves the individual coastal states of the 
southern Mediterranean alone to manage unilaterally or 
bilaterally such important issues as illegal immigration 
cannot work […]. Italy cannot be the only country that 
carries out [actions] in all Maghreb countries27.  
 
24 Government led by Giuseppe Conte (populist government, 2018-2019). 
25 Parliamentary intervention, 26 July 2018. 
26 Government led by Silvio Berlusconi (center-right, 2008-2011). 




Likewise, in its inaugural speech to Parliament in 2016, the Prime Minister 
Paolo Gentiloni (Democratic Party)28 declared that “we cannot accept a Europe that is 
too strict on some aspects of its austerity policies and too tolerant towards countries 
that do not accept to share common responsibilities on immigration issues”29. Similar 
to Maroni and Gentiloni, in 2018 the Prime Minister Conte highlighted that  
(9) Europe has allowed selfish closures of many Member 
States, which have ended up passing on to the border states 
- and primarily to our country - the burdens and difficulties 
that should have been shared […]. Italy cannot be left alone 
in the face of such challenges […]. We therefore want to 
promote a fairer distribution of responsibilities at European 
level30.  
 
This discourse is certainly also linked to the pitfalls of the Dublin Regulation, which 
have been highlighted by national decision-makers in several occasions. 
 
Hungary: Domesticised humanitarianism 
The Hungarian elite have exploited the border position of Hungary to accrue 
political gains. In order, they have portrayed Hungary as the defender of the European 
civilisation. More recently, “defending Europe despite the West” qualified the anti-
immigrant policies and politics. The Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has stated 
numerous times that Hungary defends not only the Hungarian border, but also the 
South-eastern border of Europe from the “wandering of the people”, alluding to the 
Great wandering of the Peoples in ancient times from East to West. To this extent, 
 
28 Center-left, 2016 – 2018. 
29 Inaugural speech to Parliament, 13 December 2016. 
30 Inaugural speech to Parliament (Senate and Chamber of Deputies), 5 and 6 June 2018. 
 
 
Orbán alleges that the European “liberal elite” have denied the danger, and foregrounds 
Hungary, once more, as a nation defending Europe. 31 
This narrative is important to understand the evolution of border management 
practices in Hungary, particularly in the aftermath of the sudden increase in irregular 
migrant arrivals in 2015. To reflect on Orbán’s self-assigned role to make Hungary 
Europe’s defender, Hungary has interpreted the EU border management regime to serve 
its own priorities and introduced an international protection programme, “Hungary 
Helps!”, to assist the Middle Eastern Christians that it conceived as an extension of the 
European self.  
Since having joined the EU, Hungary followed a “policy of border 
securitisation, which essentially entailed a re-nationalisation of its border regime and 
its framing of the political border as a protective barrier against threats to national and 
European identity” (Scott 2018, 19; Lamour and Varga 2017). To achieve a borderless 
zone between Hungary and its neighbouring states with Hungarian minorities has been 
a political objective for Fidesz governments over years (Scott 2018, 25). The Schengen-
enlargement and removal of visa for East European states helped the elite to fulfil this 
objective. Yet, as the State Secretary for Parliamentary and Strategic Affairs Bálazs 
Orbán has indicated, “[Hungarians] do not like borders because it has separated them 
from one and other, but not because others from us” (Orbán foreword in Baudet 2015: 
17). The period after 2015, as Scott (2018, 26) notes, how Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz 
government has exploited borders both “physically and symbolically in ways that 
resonate with fear of migrants and conservative scepticism of multiculturalism and 
open borders”. In this very period the Hungarian government appended its politics, 
 
31 Orbán Viktor sajtónyilatkozata az Európai Tanács rendkívüli ülését követően az M1 Híradónak, October 2016, 





policy and narratives of border management to the emergent scepticism with European 
federalism and multiculturalism apparent amongst the conservative circles in Europe.  
In terms of the policies, one can note five key developments namely the border 
fence patrolled by armed police and military personnel; surveillance mechanisms, the 
inadmissibility criteria, the blanket rejection of asylum claimants arriving through 
Serbia; criminalisation of irregular entry and any activity that facilitates protection and 
reception of migrants; the forcible removal of undocumented asylum seekers 
apprehended within 8 km of the border fence, commonly known as “8 km” rule, which 
was later expanded to encompass the whole territory of Hungary; and finally the 
establishment of “transit-zone” to submit asylum applications along the Hungarian-
Serbian border fence (Gyollai and Korkut, 2019). Hence, what started discursively with 
the securitisation of migration in Hungary brought more fundamental legal and policy 
changes. Nagy (2016) considered the developments in this period in Hungary as denial, 
deterrence, obstruction, punishment, lack of solidarity and breaching domestic, 
European and international law. 
To this extent, Kallius, Monterescu, and Rajaram (2016, 27) alluded the 
construction of a border fence and transit zones at the border with neighbouring Serbia 
as well as Croatia after 2015 to an attempt to “fabricate the political through processes 
of marginalisation and exclusion wherein a number of groups have at best a tangential 
relation to the political norm”. The creation of transit zones allowed the Hungarian 
government to culminate securitisation of mobility and “fix […] asylum-seekers in time 
and space and make them invisible to mainstream society” (Scott 2018, 27). This is 
both a geopolitical and cultural border securitisation according to Scott (2018, 27). 
Orbán also connoted a European dimension for Hungary’s security-oriented border 
management practices and blamed the liberal politicians of the EU and as its extension 
 
 
the federalist bureaucrats of the European Commission for uncontrolled migration. As 
we will discuss looking at emerging narratives below, Orbán made it very clear that 
Hungary was protecting the European borders and that its actions cannot be considered 
as against European solidarity. Hungary’s defiance of the refugee resettlement quota 
has become the most emblematic of migration governance and border management in 
this period.  
Central to the Hungarian border politics has been how to situate Hungary and 
the Hungarian southern borders to demark the ‘European’ external border. This stance 
very much originates from the historical position of the Catholic Church against the 
Ottoman occupiers of the country, who were not only not European, but also Muslim 
(Pap and Glied 2017). This led to a security and law-enforcement-focused narrative 
(Brown and Dadu 2018; Szalai, Csornai and Garai 2017). According to this narrative, 
the country’s location at the external border of the EU, and hence its exposure to 
irregular migration should require a security-oriented response to migration (Szalai, 
Csornai and Garai 2017, 22). In this context, the Hungarian Prime Minister appealed 
both to the Hungarian but the wider European public using such tropes as ‘migration 
brings dangers’ and that ‘Hungary will not become a nation of migrants’ reinforcing 
the security and law enforcement narrative demanding a hard European border against 
irregular arrivals.  
Following an identity-oriented narrative (Szalai, Csornai and Garai 2017; Szalai 
2017), Orbán also set a demarcation line internally between the internationalist 
socialist/liberal elite versus people with national consciousness. He designated a ‘pro-
migration lobby’ both at home and in Europe in the shape of NGOs and socialist/liberal 
politicians, and their alleged external supporter George Soros (Gyollai and Korkut 
2019). This helped him undermine humanitarianism and human-rights-oriented 
 
 
narrative (Brown and Dadu 2018) demoting the practitioners’ actions as naive and 
alienated from the threat facing Europe. Hence, his overarching narrative referred not 
only to the ‘external other’, but also the ‘internal other’. Below, we depict three tropes 
that Orbán circulated extensively in politics and in the public sphere to underline the 
humanitarianism/securitisation nexus.  
 
- Hungary defends the European borders: 
At any venue possible, Orbán has presented migration as the biggest threat to 
Europe. He advised the police at their inauguration ceremony: “You are the protectors 
of our culture, lifestyle and our sovereignty. Our thousand years of statehood without 
any doubt give [us] the right for defending our borders, our citizens and our culture.32 
According to Orbán, the new népvándorlás or wandering of people would question all 
that was taken for granted in Europe. He stated:  
(10)  When we defend our borders, we do not only do something for  
Hungary, not only protect Hungary’s interests, but the whole, 
everyone who is behind us, that is, the whole Europe. Those EU 
member states, which fail to defend the European borders, are the 




Orbán’s politicisation of the European quota regime and its solidarity 
component presented domesticised humanitarianism most contentiously. In 2015 the 
interior ministers at the European Council agreed to the Commission’s proposal to 
relocate 120,000 refugees despite Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic remaining 
defiant. The majority voting did not ensure their compliance and in return the 
 
32 Orbán Viktor beszéde a rendőr tiszthelyettesek eskütételén, September 2015, [Online] Available at: 
http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/orban-viktor-beszede-a-rendor-tiszthelyettesek-eskutetelen-2/ 
33 Orbán Viktor sajtónyilatkozata az Európai Tanács rendkívüli ülését követően az M1 Híradónak, October 2016, 





Commission instituted infringement procedures in June 2017 for their failure to take 
“the necessary action” under the 2015 plan (European Commission 2017 in Murray and 
Longo 2018, 414). Despite the EU’s search for solidarity for burden sharing across the 
EU member states, Orbán promoted his own understanding of solidarity. This was 
taking on the responsibility to protect European external border but not the solidarity 
of the EU quota regime, given its aimed relocation of refugees across the EU member 
states in an equitable manner. Hence, humanitarianism was not with those in need but 
for the European publics allegedly threatened with irregular migrants reflecting a 
security-oriented rather than humanitarianism-oriented solidarity. To seek an audience 
for its anti-migration narrative, Hungary held a referendum in 2016 on the EU’s 
proposed distribution of refugees among EU states. Challenging the Commission, the 
government asked Hungarian voters if they wanted the Hungarian government to abide 
by “the mandatory relocation of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the 
approval of the Hungarian parliament”. Orbán also assumed that the quota referendum 
in Hungary would have meant a major breakthrough for the anti-migration voice in 
Europe.  
(11)  We oppose the politically correct migration policy and have decided  
to stand by the defence of [our] borders. […] We, Hungarians, are 
one of the committed countries with the European Union. Our 
commitment to European common future is stronger than ever. This 
is the very reason why we want to change [the quota system] to 
defend Europe, which we all love, feel ourselves at home, for which 
we gave sacrifices.34 
 
Although the referendum did not pass, the government intention remained and was 
furthered by key policy changes.  
 
- We do not want to become a nation of migrants:  
 





Orbán endorsed the conservative and radical right assumption that the 
multiculturalism and internationalism European socialist/liberal projects. Henceforth, 
Orbán depicted humanitarian stance that seeks to protect the other as a threat to 
European security (Gyollai and Korkut 2019). At the Future of Europe at the Visegrad 
4 conference in January 2018, he stated:  
(12) Although in Central Europe, we can talk about migration as a  
phenomenon emerging after 2015, its positive depiction, support, its 
evolution into a European item has started long before 2015. This 
has started not with willkommenskultur, but when the United 
Nations General Secretary gave a presentation at the European 
Parliament to recommend Europe that migrants will need Europe 
and Europe will need migrants. Europe should leave its prejudices 
behind about migration, it needs to open up channels for migrants, 
and that migration is a solution not a problem. Yet, we do not want 
to become a nation of migrants. We do not want to see what the 
migrant communities of Western Europe bring: terror, public 
insecurities, the feeling of safety and comfort of being at home that 
the native nations would feel at the face of migration.35  
 
Standing to protect the self from the other, Orbán alleged that an international lobby, 
composing not only the European Commission but also the United Nations, and NGOs 
as the domestic accomplices of the international lobby were at odds with how the 
‘natives’ would prefer to run their affairs. This humanitarian narrative, he implied, was 
prone to unleash insecurities for the self (Gyollai and Korkut 2019).  
 
- International migration lobby and its domestic partners are against us: 
Subsequently, the European Parliament triggered infringement procedures 
against Hungary for its breach of democratic values with the launch of the so-called 
Article 7 sanction mechanism in September 2018. In its aftermath, the Hungarian 
government instigated a new campaign with a “necessary and effective way to get the 
 





government’s message across to the Hungarian people”, said Zoltán Kovács, the Prime 
Minister’s spokesman.36 The Sargentini report voted at the European Parliament in 
September 2018, concluded that the Hungarian government’s clampdowns on judicial 
independence, freedom of expression, minority rights and NGO activities constituted a 
“systemic risk” to the bloc’s fundamental values. Still, Orbán has depicted the Article 
7 process as an act of revenge by the European elite intent on punishing Hungary for 
its vehement opposition to migration and refusal to accept an EU scheme to share 
refugees.37  
(13)  The European elite declared bankruptcy, and the symbol of this  
bankruptcy is the European Commission. […] The good news is that 
the days of the European Commission is numbered. […] Because 
they have rejected their roots, and instead of Christian Europe they 
looked for building a Europe of open society. […] In Europe of open 
society, there are no borders. The European people can be 
exchanged with migrants. […] The nation, the national identity and 
national feeling are negative and considered as dying, and the state 
does not guarantee security in Europe.38   
 
Yet, the security-oriented narrative should not mean that humanitarianism has 
been fully ignored by the Hungarian politicians. The Hungarian leaders sought to create 
an image of their country as a “protector” of Europe and Middle Eastern Christians 
despite detaining asylum seekers in containers at transit zones. Within Europe, they 
argued, European Christians needed protection while outside Europe, the Middle 
Eastern Christians needed humanitarianism the most. To depict a protector image, 
Hungary has started the “Hungary Helps!” program in 2017 to support persecuted 
Christians. The pillars of the program, according to the state secretary in charge Azbej 
 




37 EU Parliament votes to trigger Article 7 sanctions procedure against Hungary – DW, September 2018, Available 
online at: https://www.unian.info/world/10257936-eu-parliament-votes-to-trigger-article-7-sanctions-procedure-
against-hungary-dw.html 





Tristan, were immediate action and sincerity. He stated “Hungary is unashamedly 
proud of its Christian cultural foundations and it builds its national and foreign policy 
following these foundations.” “To avoid the mistake that many international aid 
organisations has made”, the Hungarian government did not decide on anyone’s behalf, 
but instead went to the Middle East to see how they can help those in need.39 This 
showed the Hungarian government’s attempts to foster a domestic self at home and 
wider Europe and an extension of the self in the shape of the Middle Eastern Christian. 
The Hungarian, European, and their extension needed protection not the irregular 
migrant. Still this humanitarianism implied both the Middle Eastern Christian and the 
Muslim migrant were to be kept at bay: the Christians in their homelands in the Middle 
East and the other at detention zones.  
 
Conclusion:  
In this article, we concentrated on humanitarian- and security-oriented aspects 
of migration politics. Our two cases present two different mechanisms of political 
communication. Essentially, in Italy references to concrete policy measures are more 
conspicuous than they are in Hungary. In Italy, the dominant narratives have revolved 
around the need to save migrants' lives and protect their human rights 
(humanitarianism) and to combat illegal immigration, smuggling of migrants, and 
terrorism (securitisation). These narratives have gone hand in hand, showing the crucial 
role played by the humanitarian/securitisation nexus that lies behind the development 
of the overall Italian strategy. Moreover, the evidence shows that Italian decision-
makers – from both the center-left and the center-right – have emphasised the necessity 
to establish a fair distribution of responsibilities between the EU Member States in 
 
39 (Available at https://888.hu/article-igy-segit-magyarorszag-a-kozel-keleti-keresztenyeken) 
 
 
tackling migration flows (solidarity), as well as the need to establish cooperation with 
North African countries (externalisation). In Hungary, there is an ideational making of 
migration politics aligned with securitisation-oriented policy mechanisms for border 
controls. The protection mechanism for Hungary is extra-territorial and selective, that 
is, helping the Middle Eastern Christians in situ and in their original homelands. Or 
else, it is for the native Europeans whose rights should be defended from migration 
flows.  
Conversely, concerning irregular migrants arriving to Hungary through the 
southern borders, the government has adopted a security-oriented stance. In justifying 
the newly implemented border control measures, the government discursively 
operationalised religion, and Hungary’s historical past and freedom fighting traditions 
in order to facilitate the positive public acceptance of its political agenda. The 
dehumanisation of migrants, their discursive representation as threat to Hungary’s 
religious and national identity and territorial integrity foregrounded national security 
objectives, and simultaneously marginalised humanitarian concerns with the aim to 
invalidate sentiments of solidarity. The analogous interpretation and presentation of 
past and present events served to overcome and resolve the cognitive dissonance of 
shutting the borders and deny support to tens of thousands of asylum seekers.  
Yet, what appears with respect to political communication is 
humanitarian/securitisation nexus set the terms of migration and human rights debate. 
In this debate, references to both institutional and narrative-oriented pillars of migration 
politics mattered to an extent the politicians discursively made first what is fair 
protection, second whose rights should be protected, and third who should European 
societies collaborate with to make sure that they themselves are protected. To this 
extent, our article has proposed a review of Italian and Hungarian political languages 
 
 
to represent the making of migration governance in two EU Border States. Considering 
the difference in their respective length of EU membership, we show that the 
formulation of references change such as to institutions in the Italian case and a meta 
narrative in the Hungarian case. Yet, notwithstanding their differences, our article also 
showed that political communication operates to foreground the human rights of the 
self, the extended self, or the other as long as they meet the demands of the self. This 
imposes conditions on the rights of the other that is in most need of guarantees, such as 
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